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History or custom or social utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or
sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our
law, must come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where to go.1
Benjamin N. Cardozo
I. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of contractual remedies, there are two axioms upon
which legal scholars and jurists have come to rely, to wit, the court
will not make for the parties a better contract than they made for
themselves,2 and the goal of awarding contract damages is to put the
aggrieved party in as good of a position as he would have enjoyed upon
full performance. 3 These two basic principles were etched into con-
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (Yale Univ.
Press 1921).
2. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 31:5, at 298-99 (Richard
A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1999).
3. This is commonly referred to as the expectancy measure of damages. See E. AL-
LAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 730 (4th ed. 2004) ("How do courts en-
courage promises to rely on promises? Ordinarily they do so by protecting the
expectation that the injured party had when making the contract by attempting
to put that party in as good a position as it would have been in had the contract
been performed, that is, had there been no breach. The interest measured in this
way is called the expectation interest and is said to give the injured party the
'benefit of the bargain.'"); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2001) ("The remedies pro-
vided ... must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may
be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed . . .");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) ("[H]is 'expectation inter-
est'. . . is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good
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tract jurisprudence with the tools of justice and retribution in order to
assure that contracting parties remain in complete control of their re-
lations and that judicial involvement in contractual disputes is limited
to fulfilling the intent of the parties. 4 Thus, whenever a doctrine ap-
pears to run afoul of the underpinnings of contractual intent, it stands
to reason that its veracity is called into question.
This Article calls into question one such doctrine, the doctrine of
economic waste. As applied in the context of contractual rights and
remedies, the doctrine of economic waste exemplifies the difficulties of
utilizing a robust but misunderstood theoretical construct. While
such a doctrine is best understood from an economic perspective, such
a perspective has been virtually ignored in the doctrine's jurispruden-
tial application in contract law. Theoretical ignorance and a cavalier
application of the economic waste doctrine is particularly problematic
when it leads to confounding and incoherent remedial outcomes that
defy the primary goal of contract damages-that is, to award the non-
breaching party his expectation interests. 5
"Economic waste" is the label that courts have adopted as justifica-
tion for not awarding an aggrieved party the cost of performance 6 as
damages for breach of a construction contract. 7 Although it is widely
accepted that cost of performance is generally the proper measure of
damages to compensate for deficient performance under a construc-
tion contract, it is also widely regarded that such damages may be
inappropriate when the increase in objective value to be achieved by
finishing the task is grossly disproportionate to the cost involved.8
This gross disparity is commonly referred to as economic waste, which
is frowned upon by the majority of courts, causing them to opt for an
alternative measure of the loss of value in terms of the diminution in
value-the difference in value with and without completion of the con-
tract.9 Moreover, concerns about creating a windfall for the aggrieved
party are used to bolster adoption of the alternative measure of dam-
ages because the court generally does not believe the aggrieved party
a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed ... ."); see
generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937) (recognized as the semi-
nal article on the expectation, reliance and restitution interests in the context of
contracts).
4. See 11 WILLISTON, supra note 2.
5. See 24 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 64:1, at 7-11.
6. The term "cost of performance" is used generically in this Article to refer to cost of
remedying construction defects, as well as the cost of completing the
construction.
7. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.13, at 790.
8. See Carol Chomsky, Of Spoil Pits and Swimming Pools: Reconsidering the Mea-
sure of Damages for Construction Contracts, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1445, 1451-52
(1991).
9. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1452, 1454.
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will, in fact, use the damages awarded to finish a task that would re-
sult in little or no increase in market value.1O
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the justifica-
tion for the use of this alternative measure of damages with the basic
notions of economics and contractual intent. This difficulty stems
from the misunderstanding of the economics of a bargained-for ex-
change, whereby both parties have weighed the pros and cons of enter-
ing into the transaction beforehand and have decided they are better
off entering into the deal than not." The bargain between the parties
is supposed to reflect their assessment of the costs and benefits of do-
ing exactly what they agreed to do. Thus, when a court upsets this
bargain after the fact by unilaterally deciding the parties' exchange is
not worth what the parties agreed to pay or do, the court then creates
a situation whereby the aggrieved party is not given the equivalent of
the benefit of her bargain, and the breaching party is in a better posi-
tion than he would have been had he fully performed. Thus, the wind-
fall inures to the benefit of the breaching party. The result is an
economically inefficient transaction, the very thing that the court os-
tensibly sought to prevent by resort to this alternative, albeit less de-
sirable, measure of damages.
This Article explores the myths, misunderstanding, and malcon-
tent generated by the judicial application of the economic waste doc-
trine. It specifically examines the doctrine of economic waste as it is
commonly invoked as a justification for awarding diminution-in-value
damages, ultimately revealing that the very condition (i.e., economic
waste) the court seeks to avoid, ironically, is created when the court
strays from its role of fulfilling the intent of the parties, alas the myth.
This reverse phenomenon occurs because of a failure to understand
the basic premise of economic waste from a microeconomics perspec-
tive, thus the misunderstanding. Given the myth and misunderstand-
ing of the economic waste doctrine as applied in contract cases, as well
as the litany of inconsistent and incoherent remedial outcomes re-
vealed by a review of its judicial application, it can be of no surprise
that the propriety of the current state of the law is suspect and in need
of change, hence the malcontent.
Part II commences the following analysis with a discussion of the
origin and development of the economic waste doctrine, as well as its
modern application in renowned cases widely cited for discussion of
the diminution-in-value alternative measure of damages. Part III ex-
plains economic waste from an economic perspective. Its discussion of
the perfectly competitive model of microeconomics provides a back-
10. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112 (Okla. 1962).
11. For discussion of economic's equimarginal maximizing principle upon which ra-
tional actions and decisions are assumed to be premised, see infra note 83 and
accompanying text.
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drop for a proper understanding of the economic waste doctrine. Part
IV analyzes the expected strategic behavior of contracting parties
utilizing conventional theoretical game models to further demonstrate
problems with the courts' present application of the economic waste
doctrine. Part V highlights the fallacies in the general assumption
that this alternative measure of damages is needed to prevent eco-
nomic waste, it explains how this alternative measure actually creates
economic waste, and it suggests a simplified default rule for determin-
ing the proper measure of damages. Finally, Part VI concludes with a
few thoughts about how the policies and premises discussed in this
Article hold true in evaluating the propriety of other types of contrac-
tual remedies, thereby raising issues deserving of additional
exploration.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC WASTE DOCTRINE
A. Doctrinal Origins
The term "economic waste" has been bantered about since at least
the early 1900s 1 2 in many different contexts. 13 The fact that it is sel-
dom, if ever, defined by the user creates the appearance that it has no
readily identifiable shared meaning.14 Instead, the term is commonly
used to generally describe some undesirable result viewed as a waste
of valuable resources. 15 In contract law, the economic waste doctrine
is often described as the jurisprudential justification for providing an
alternative measure of damages (i.e., diminution in value) in connec-
tion with the breach of a contract when it is shown that the preferred
measure of cost of performance has no rational relationship to the ob-
jective or market value such cost will achieve. 16 This alternative mea-
12. See People ex rel. Linton v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 75 N.Y.S. 202, 206 (App.
Div. 1902).
13. See, e.g., Lin v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 A.2d 798, 806 (Conn. 2006) (refer-
ring to the expenditure of funds and resources on unnecessary trials as economic
waste); Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, 873 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2005) (referring to multiple insurance policies covering the same property as
economic waste); Richard G. Collins, Note, Synthesizing Criteria and Accounting
for Economic Waste in Environmental Laches, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 235, 259 (2004) (discussing whether the abandonment of a project due to
environmental concerns will result in economic waste).
14. See Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 733, 743 n.52 (1982).
15. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1452 n.31; E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies
for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1173 (1970).
16. See, e.g., 11 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 60.2, at 616 (2005).
879
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sure of damages generally has been reserved for construction
contracts. 17
It is commonly acknowledged that the economic waste doctrine
originated in the opinion rendered in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 18
penned by Justice Cardozo.19 In that case, a written residential con-
struction contract called for the use of a specific brand of plumbing
pipe (known as Reading pipe). After completion of construction, the
owner discovered that the builder used an alternative brand of pipe
(known as Cohoes pipe) for some of the plumbing work and thus re-
fused to pay the builder the balance due under the contract. The court
decried the harshness of a rule which would deprive a builder of com-
pensation under the contract where he performed as promised except
for a trivial and innocent omission.2O Where such is the case, the
builder is deemed to have substantially performed, thereby entitling
him to receive the promised compensation under the contract, less any
amount of damages his deficient performance caused the aggrieved
party to sustain.2 1 In determining whether less than full performance
constitutes substantial performance, the court stated that the follow-
ing factors must be considered and weighed: "[Tlhe purpose to be
served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the
letter, [and] the cruelty of enforced adherence." 22
In Jacob & Youngs, the court observed that the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance was created by the courts as an instrument of
justice, and the damages that follow must likewise reflect that same
goal. 2 3 Noting that there was no difference in the objective value be-
tween the two brands of pipe, the court enunciated the following rule
regarding the proper measure of damages: "The owner is entitled to
the money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of com-
pletion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be at-
tained. When that is true, the measure is the difference in value."24
The difference in value, commonly referred to as the diminution in
value, refers to the difference between the market value of the prop-
erty had the contract been fully performed and the market value of the
17. See id. § 60.1, at 606; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CAI.A I AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS
§ 14.29, at 606 (5th ed. 2003). Although the alternative measure of damages (i.e.,
diminution in value) is generally reserved for construction cases, its application
is relevant to any contract in which a party's expectancy interest primarily re-
lates to the performance of a construction-type service (e.g., repair and refurbish-
ment services, painting services, etc.).
18. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
19. See Marschall, supra note 14, at 752 n.96.
20. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891.
21. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 8.12, at 548.
22. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891.
23. Id. at 892.
24. Id. at 891.
[Vol. 85:875880
2007] ECONOMIC WASTE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES 881
property in its defective or incomplete condition.2 5 Although the court
never used the term "economic waste," the exception crafted by the
court setting forth a mandatory alternative measure of damages has
since been dubbed the economic waste doctrine. 26
As illustrated in Jacob & Youngs, substantial performance is aptly
regarded as the counterpart of economic waste. 2 7 Without the benefit
of the substantial performance doctrine, a deficiently performing con-
tractor would never be able to earn a discharge of his duty to perform,
thereby giving rise to the duty of the owner to pay the contract price. 28
This correlation is also insightful because in its discussion of the sub-
stantial performance doctrine in Jacob & Youngs, the court acknowl-
edged that parties are free to make the fulfillment of each and every
aspect of the contract an express condition of recovery of the contract
price by the contractor, thereby closing the door on substantial per-
formance. 2 9 In terms of avoiding operation of the economic waste doc-
trine, this would likewise seem to give the aggrieved owner leverage
against the breaching contractor in requiring him to fully perform
before he is entitled to be paid under the contract, including having
him redo deficient portions of the work that may require substantial
effort and resources despite yielding a low return in value.
In 1932, the Restatement of Contracts3o was released with a provi-
sion giving the aggrieved party the choice between cost of completion
25. Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1446.
26. See, e.g., Austin-Westshore Constr. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d
1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991); William L. Patton, Jr. Family Ltd. P'ship v. Simon
Prop. Group, Inc., No. 4:04V1477GH, 2005 WL 2122649 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31,
2005); Reutemann v. Lewis Aquatech, Inc., No. Civ.A. DKC2004-0063, 2005 WL
1593473 (D. Md. July 5, 2005); RLI Ins. Co. v. MLK Ave. Redevelopment Corp.,
925 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2005); Fahey v. Senterline Constr. Co., No. CV030082081S,
2005 WL 2503724 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2005); Bonanno v. Harbour Paint-
ing, Inc., No. CV040568832S, 2005 WL 2981697 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2005);
Grossman Holdings, Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 1982);
Brown v. Holland, No. CL 93936, 2005 WL 2861973 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 28,
2005); State ex rel. Stovall v. Reliance Ins. Co., 107 P.3d 1219 (Kan. 2005); Andru-
lis v. Levin Constr. Corp., 628 A.2d 197 (Md. 1993); Stom v. St. Clair Corp., 153
S.W.3d 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Martin v. Lake Mohawk Prop. Owner's Ass'n,
No. 04 CA 815, 2005 WL 3610352 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2005); Hall v. Hubco,
Inc., No. 14-05-00073-CV, 2006 WL 300314 (Tex. App. Feb. 9, 2006); Crest, Inc. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.3d 349 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). The above sam-
pling of citations is but a small fraction of the totality of cases and jurisdictions in
which the exception to the awarding of cost-of-performance damages has been
characterized as the economic waste doctrine.
27. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1107, 1157 (1984).
28. See Mark Kadi, Applications of the Substantial Performance Doctrine in Private
and Federal Government Contracts, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 295, 296 (1995).
29. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891.
30. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, at vii-ix (1932) ("[The First] Restatement of Con-
tracts mark[ed] the completion by The American Law Institute of its work on the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and diminution in value.31 Like the Jacob & Youngs court, this provi-
sion included a limitation on whether the aggrieved owner could re-
cover his cost of completion.3 2 However, the drafters substituted the
term "economic waste" for the disproportionality test referenced in Ja-
cob & Youngs. Nevertheless, the first Restatement was viewed as con-
sistent with Jacob & Youngs. 33
In the 1962 case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,34
farm owners entered into a written lease with a coal mining company
that required the company to pay a stated sum to the farm owners for
strip mining, as well as to perform restorative and remedial work on
first of a series of volumes designed to cover the restatement of the principal
subjects of the law .... The Institute is composed of two classes of members-
elected life members and official members. Official members are the justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, senior judges of the United States Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, the chief justices of the highest courts of the several
States and the District of Columbia, the president and members of the Executive
Committee of the American Bar Association, the presidents of the State Bar As-
sociations, the president of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, the presidents of certain learned legal societies .... and the
deans of member schools of the Association of American Law Schools .... The
American Law Institute was formed in the belief that in order to clarify and sim-
plify the law and to render it more certain, the first step must be the preparation of
an orderly restatement of the common law, including in that term not only the law
developed solely by judicial decision but also the law which has grown from the
application by the courts of generally and long adopted statutes." (emphasis
added)).
31. See id. § 346(1)(a)(i)-(ii). This section explains that
(1) For a breach by one who has contracted to construct a specified prod-
uct, the other party can get judgment for compensatory damages for
all unavoidable harm that the builder had reason to foresee when the
contract was made, less such part of the contract price as has not
been paid and is not still payable, determined as follows:
(a) For defective or unfinished construction he can get judgment for
either
(i) the reasonable cost of construction and completion in accor-
dance with the contract, if this is possible and does not in-
volve unreasonable economic waste; or
(ii) the difference between the value that the product contracted
for would have had and the value of the performance that has
been received by the plaintiff, if construction and completion
in accordance with the contract would involve unreasonable
economic waste.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. See id.; see also id. § 346 cmt. b ("Sometimes defects in a completed structure
cannot be physically remedied without tearing down and rebuilding, at a cost
that would be imprudent and unreasonable. The law does not require damages to
be measured by a method requiring such economic waste. If no such waste is
involved, the cost of remedying the defect is the amount awarded as compensa-
tion for failure to render the promised performance." (emphasis added)).
33. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1452.
34. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
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the land at the end of the lease term. 35 However, the coal mining com-
pany refused to restore the land at the end of the lease. The court
cited with approval section 346(1)(a) of the first Restatement for its use
of the term "economic waste,"3 6 as well as Jacob & Youngs for the
disproportionality limitation on damages. 3 7 Although the court was
careful to distinguish a coal mining lease with a restoration provision
from a building and construction contract, it nevertheless pointed to
cases and other sources discussing damages for breach of building and
construction contracts in support of its adoption of the diminution-in-
value alternative measure of damages for breach of the land restora-
tion provision.38 However, the Peevyhouse court then proceeded to al-
ter the economic waste doctrine by stating that the breach must also
relate to a provision that is merely incidental to the main purpose of
the contract, in addition to the cost of performance being grossly dis-
proportionate to the economic benefit which would result, in order for
the aggrieved owner to be limited to diminution-in-value damages. 39
B. A Shift in Nomenclature
In 1981, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was promulgated
with significant changes to the economic waste doctrine as reflected in
the first Restatement, as well as in longstanding case law.40 The most
notable change in the second Restatement's approach was the elimina-
tion of the term "economic waste." The comments to this revised sec-
35. Id. at 111.
36. Id. at 112.
37. Id. at 113. The pedagological importance of Peevyhouse cannot be underesti-
mated with respect to its influence on students of the law. For example, it is
discussed in most of the leading contract textbooks. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT,
CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE 918 (3d ed. 2003); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C.
BusHAw, CONTRACTS, CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 659 (2003); STEVEN J.
BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 315 (3d ed. 2006); THOMAS D. CRANDALL &
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 233 (4th
ed. 2004); JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDER-
SON, CONTRACTS 19-22, 40 (8th ed. 2003); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F.
YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS 518 (6th ed. 2001); BRUCE W. FRIER &
JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 478 (2005); LON L. FULLER &
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 228 (7th ed. 2001); FRIEDRICH
KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 1119 (3d ed. 1986); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY
G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 750, 829-30 (5th
ed. 2003); STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS:
LAW IN ACTION 151, 161-62 (2d ed. 2003); IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL,
CONTRACTS, EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 132 (3d ed. 2001); JOHN ED-
WARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 820 (5th ed. 2000); RICH-
ARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN ARYES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 936 (6th ed. 2003).
38. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d. at 112-13.
39. Id. at 114.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) (1981). This section explains
that
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tion indicate the drafters viewed this term as misleading since an
aggrieved party was not likely to spend his cost of completion damages
remedying defects if such were calculated to yield little or no return.4 1
Instead, the drafters opted to express concerns over giving the ag-
grieved owner a substantial windfall.42
The second Restatement also appears to make significant changes
to the disproportionality limitation on damages enunciated in Jacob &
Youngs. First, the diminution-in-value versus reasonable-cost-of-per-
formance choice only becomes relevant if the value of the loss to the
injured party cannot be proved with sufficient certainty.43 Thus, the
aggrieved party is presumptively entitled to recover damages mea-
sured by the loss in value to him, provided he can prove such loss with
sufficient certainty. 44 Second, if the aggrieved party is not able to
prove his actual loss with sufficient certainty, the revision appears to
give him the choice between diminution in value and reasonable cost
If a breach results in defective or unfinished construction and the loss in
value to the injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may
recover damages based on
(a) the diminution in the market price of the property caused by the
breach, or
(b) the reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying
the defects if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the proba-
ble loss in value to him.
Id.
41. See id. § 348 cmt. c ("Sometimes, however, such a large part of the cost to remedy
the defects consists of the cost to undo what has been improperly done that the
cost to remedy the defects will be clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in
value to the injured party. Damages based on the cost to remedy the defects
would then give the injured party a recovery greatly in excess of the loss in value
to him and result in a substantial windfall. Such an award will not be made. It is
sometimes said that the award would involve 'economic waste,' but this is a mis-
leading expression since an injured party will not, even if awarded an excessive
amount of damages, usually pay to have the defects remedied if to do so will cost
him more than the resulting increase in value to him."). Comprehending the
meaning of this comment is problematic. It is unclear as to why characterizing
such an award as involving economic waste is "misleading" because an injured
party may not use such an award to have the defects remedied. Whether the
award is actually used to remedy defective performance or pocketed by the plain-
tiff, under the jurisprudential application of the economic waste doctrine, the
award constitutes economic waste. This comment, however, demonstrates a very
cavalier and ambiguous understanding of the economic waste doctrine as refer-
enced and applied in construction contract cases.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 348(2); see also id. § 348 cmt. c ('Sometimes, especially if the perform-
ance is defective as distinguished from incomplete, it may not be possible to prove
the loss in value to the injured party with reasonable certainty. In that case he
can usually recover damages based on the cost to remedy the defects. Even if this
gives him a recovery somewhat in excess of the loss in value to him, it is better
that he receive a small windfall than that he be undercompensated by being lim-
ited to the resulting diminution in the market price of his property.").
44. See id. § 348(2).
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of completion.4 5 However, the comments indicate that the aggrieved
party's ability to recover under the diminution-in-value choice is actu-
ally limited by the provision disallowing recovery for loss the ag-
grieved party reasonably could have avoided. 4 6 Thus, where the
diminished value damages are larger but could have been avoided or
mitigated by completion or correction of the defects, the aggrieved
party would not be entitled to choose the higher diminished value
damages. Lastly, where the aggrieved party cannot prove with suffi-
cient certainty the loss in value to him, and thus gets to choose, he
may not choose his cost of performance if such costs are clearly dispro-
portionate to the probable loss in value to him.47
The changes embodied in the second Restatement reflect a signifi-
cant departure from both Jacob & Youngs and the first Restatement in
that they begin the analysis of the propriety of damages with the in-
quiry of whether the aggrieved party can prove with sufficient cer-
tainty his actual damages, regardless of how they are measured. If he
can, that appears to be the end of the analysis, and that is what he is
entitled to recover. Only if he cannot do so is there a need to consider
how damages should be measured.
C. The Generally Accepted Default Rule
Despite the changes to the text of the second Restatement, the com-
ments indicate an intention to preserve the diminution-in-value alter-
native measure of damages in cases of clear disproportionality
between the cost of performance and the actual loss of value to the
aggrieved party.4s In any event, courts generally continue to analyze
and decide matters under Jacob & Youngs and its progeny, using the
terminology of the first Restatement but incorrectly citing to the sec-
ond Restatement.49
D. Confusion and Malcontent
To compound the confusion with respect to the application of the
economic waste doctrine, many courts have strayed from the original
45. Id.
46. See id. § 348 cmt. c ("Since the cost to complete is usually less than the loss in
value to him, he is limited by the rule on avoidability to damages based on cost to
complete. See § 350(1). If he has actually had the work completed, damages will
be based on his expenditures if he comes within the rule stated in § 350(2).").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Park Ave. Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Buchan Devs., L.L.C., 71 P.3d 692,
699-700 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 348, but stating cost of repairs will not be awarded if they are grossly dispropor-
tionate to the value to the injured party of such repairs without inquiring
whether the aggrieved party is capable of proving his actual loss of value with
sufficient certainty); see also Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1453-54.
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FIGURE 1
Damages for Breach in Defective or Unfinished Construction Cases:
The Generally Accepted Default Rule
Breach = Unfinished or defective construction
Damages = Cost of completion or diminution in value, unless cost of
completion results in economic waste as evidence by such cost
being clearly disproportionate to the diminution in value, then
only diminution in value.
focus of the doctrine by introducing other matters for consideration
when deciding whether to apply the general measure of cost of comple-
tion or the alternative measure of diminution in value.50 For exam-
ple, in Jacob & Youngs the application of the economic waste doctrine
was premised on a finding that the contractor's breach was not inten-
tional.51 However, the court in Peevyhouse failed to address the will-
ful nature of the breach at all in holding that an award of diminution
in value was the proper measure of damages. Instead, the Peevyhouse
court simply acknowledged that the contractor conceded not perform-
ing the remedial work.5 2
In addition, courts have considered the extraneous matter of
whether the deficiency in performance relates to an aesthetic aspect of
the contract. 53 For example, where the contractor failed to perform in
accordance with aesthetic provisions of the contract, the court will
50. See Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1458-59.
51. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) ("The willful trans-
gressor must accept the penalty of his transgression."); see also Groves v. John
Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 236 (Minn. 1939) (discussing the willful nature of
defendant's breach in light of the established rule that willful breaches cannot
rise to the level of substantial performance).
52. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962). It
merits noting that the Peevyhouse court was correct to dismissively ignore the
Jacob & Youngs court's mention of "innocent" breach. A finding of "willful
breach" should have no bearing on whether to award cost-of-completion or dimi-
nution-in-value damages because of the fact that all breaches are essentially will-
ful. If not, then how can a trier of fact discern a willful breach from an innocent
breach? Moreover, if a willful breach is the only type of breach for which higher
cost-of-completion damages may be awarded, then such a doctrine effectively nul-
lifies any notion of "efficient breach" which has long been acknowledged in the
law of contracts by its refusal to award punitive damages or to recognize stipu-
lated damage clauses that provide for the payment of penalty damages. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16, at 100 intro. n. (1982) ("'Willful'
breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches .... In general, there-
fore, a party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract if he will
still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the injured party for the
resulting loss.").
53. See, e.g., Gory Associated Indus., Inc. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 358
So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); 0. W. Grun Roofing & Constr. Co. v. Cope,
529 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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generally find that the contract has not been substantially per-
formed.54 Thus, requiring the contractor to correct or pay to correct
the deficiencies, even at great cost, is not likely to be regarded as eco-
nomic waste.
Simply put, courts are not consistent in their application of the cur-
rent default rule dictating when cost of performance or diminution in
value should be used. The second Restatement's provision is either
misunderstood or blatantly ignored by courts purporting to adopt such
a position. 55 Most courts improperly start their analysis with the
choice between cost of performance and diminution in value in light of
the degree of disproportionality between the two.56 In misapplying
the rule, they overlook the correct starting point of the analysis-
whether the loss of value to the aggrieved party can be proved with
sufficient certainty.57 This inquiry allows an aggrieved party to be
compensated based on the utility5S of the transaction to him, provided
that he is able to establish such value. Only if he is unable to do so
does the diminution-in-value alternative come into play.
Another common misapplication relates to the market value con-
sidered by the court in assessing diminution in value. In some cases,
the courts consider the relationship between the cost of performance
and the total market value of the property, as opposed to the differ-
ence in the market value with and without complete performance
under the contract. 59
In any event, improper considerations either stem from or contrib-
ute to the perception that courts are blinded by their own sense of
what the underlying transaction is actually worth to them. Obviously,
this is not a proper approach to a determination of loss of value since
it circumvents the subjective inquiry into the nature and extent of the
aggrieved party's actual loss as a result of less than full performance
under the contract.
The Peevyhouse case is the classic example of courts being guided
by their own perception of what the contractual exchange should have
been worth. The cost of performing the promised restorative and re-
medial work on the Peevyhouses' farm at the end of the lease was es-
tablished to be approximately $29,000.60 The decrease in the market
54. See Cope, 529 S.W.2d at 262.
55. See Park Ave. Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Buchan Devs., L.L.C., 71 P.3d 692,
699-700 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
56. See id.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 cmt. c (1981).
58. In the language of economics, "utility" refers to the subjective value one attaches
to the consumption of a good or service. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
59. See Council of Unit Owners of Sea Colony East, Phase III Condo. v. Carl M. Free-
man Assocs., Inc., 564 A.2d 357, 362 (Del. 1989) (discussing the cost of repairs in
relation to the full value of the property).
60. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. 1962).
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value of the property resulting from the nonperformance of the restor-
ative work was approximately $300.00.61 Thus, the court determined
that the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value and
awarded the Peevyhouses only $300.00.62
In its analysis, the court was obviously unconcerned with any sub-
jective value or utility that the Peevyhouses may have had in wanting
the property to be restored. In addition, the court ignored Garland
Coal's admissions that the Peevyhouses insisted that the restoration
provisions be added to the contract as a condition of them agreeing to
the lease.63 Obviously, the utility that the parties attached to the
transaction at the time of contracting was not attained due to the
court's willingness to disregard the intent of the parties in the name of
preventing economic waste.
To further illustrate the problem with the current approach, con-
sider the following hypothetical: Owner and contractor enter into a
written contract that requires contractor to build a house to certain
specifications for owner in exchange for payment of $700,000. The
specifications require installation of a hand-carved mahogany fire-
place mantel, which is built to order in France. Due to an oversight,
contractor neglected to order the hand-carved mahogany fireplace
mantel. Contractor seeks the full contract price upon completing the
house according to the specifications (with the exception of the hand-
carved mahogany fireplace mantel). In order to have the fireplace
mantel made, shipped and installed, it will cost $20,000. The market
value of the house without the fireplace mantel is the same as it would
be with it. Using the doctrine of substantial performance, contractor
would be entitled to recover the full contract price, less any amount of
damages owner has sustained as a result of contractor's relatively
trivial incomplete performance. Under the current approach to the
default rule, owner would not be entitled to a recoupment for the cost
of having the mantel finished because it would be deemed grossly dis-
proportionate to the increase in value that such cost would yield (in
this case, $0). In addition, owner would only be entitled to recoup
nominal damages due to the absence of any diminution in value. This
absurdity highlights the need to dispense with the current default
rule for determining the appropriate measure of damages.
E. The Economic Waste Doctrine-Misunderstood from
Inception
The economic waste doctrine appears to have been doomed from
inception, especially since it appears to have never been properly de-
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id. at 114.
63. Id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
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fined, and therefore, was incapable of being properly understood. To
the extent the Jacob & Youngs court and its progeny applied the doc-
trine in an attempt to avoid an economic inefficiency, such an applica-
tion necessarily required a more robust understanding of the
economics. After all, economic waste has a definite meaning within in
the field of microeconomics, and once properly understood, clarity can
be gained with respect to the proper application of the economic waste
doctrine.
Accordingly, an understanding of the economic waste doctrine ne-
cessitates an in-depth discussion of the economic constructs of wealth
creation. In this regard, the following Part identifies and explains
several operational conditions of the perfectly competitive market at
risk as a result of an incoherent and superficial understanding, cou-
pled with arbitrary jurisprudential application of a seemingly ambigu-
ous economic waste doctrine. Specifically, the following discussion
and analysis of the operational conditions of rationality, fully in-
formed market participants, and unimpeded supply-and-demand
forces demonstrates that the application of a misunderstood and am-
biguous economic waste doctrine results in the very economic waste
the doctrine was intended to prevent.
III. MICROECONOMICS AND ITS PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE
MODEL-A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
IDENTIFYING ECONOMIC WASTE
Economic theory has long acknowledged that the given environ-
ment within which society functions is constrained by scarcity, and
that such scarcity is the fundamental source of social and political con-
flict.64 Given such scarcity, all societies are confronted with the prob-
lem of determining (1) what, and how much, to produce; (2) how to
produce; and (3) for whom to produce.6 5 The field of microeconomics
has demonstrated that the adoption of the perfectly competitive model
provides a remarkable social mechanism with which to address the
social problems generated by scarcity. 66 The perfectly competitive
model ultimately nurtures, if not ensures, efficiencies in the alloca-
tion, production, and distribution of scarce resources. 6 7
Proper instruction regarding the requisite antecedent conditions6 8
of the perfectly competitive model is essential for the jurist, practi-
tioner, and the student engaged in the analysis of whether a contrac-
64. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 5, 9 (5th ed. 2004).
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 9.
67. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONoMIcs 623 (11th ed. 2004); ROB-
ERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONoMIcs 590-91 (5th ed. 2001).
68. The requisite antecedent conditions may also be referred to as fundamental as-
sumptions or underlying assumptions.
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tual remedy results in economic waste. Such instruction simplifies
the task of understanding the contract doctrine of economic waste, as
well as illustrates the ultimate inefficiencies created by its current ap-
plication in construction cases.
A. The Operational Conditions and Efficiencies of the
Perfectly Competitive Model
The requisite antecedent conditions of the perfectly competitive
model6 9 consist essentially of the following:
1. The existence of numerous buyers and sellers,70 each acting in-
dependently71 and rationally;72
2. Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a negligible
amount of the total output that no one buyer or seller can influ-
ence price by the amount they either consume or produce; 73
3. There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to consumer
or producer markets;74
69. See COLANDER, supra note 64, at 242 (outlining the "necessary conditions for per-
fect competition" to thrive).
70. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 356-57 ("The firm in a perfectly com-
petitive market has so many rivals that competition becomes impersonal in the
extreme.... A competitive firm faces so little of the market demand curve that its
effective demand curve is horizontal at whatever price the market will bear. A
competitive firm can decide only the output that it would like to supply to the
market given that price."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 327 ("In a
perfectly competitive market, the large number of sellers and buyers of a good
ensures that no single seller or buyer can affect its price. The market forces of
supply and demand determine price.").
71. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 426, 433-34 ("Unlike the case of mo-
nopolistic competition, the supply side of an oligopoly market is composed of a few
firms.... Conditions in oligopolistic industries tend to promote collusion, since
the number of firms is small and the firms recognize their interdependence. The
advantages to the firms of collusion seem obvious: increased profits, decreased
uncertainty, and a better opportunity to prevent others' entry."); PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 430 ("In [competitive] markets, each firm could take
price or market demand as given and largely ignore its competitors. In an oligo-
polistic market, however, a firm sets price or output based partly on strategic
considerations regarding the behavior of its competitors.").
72. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 634 (6th ed. 2005)
("[T]he economist assumes that people are rational."); see also infra note 83 (dis-
cussing rational choice as an equimarginal principle).
73. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 290 ("[Plerfect competition requires
that each participant in the market, whether a buyer or a seller, be so small in
relation to the entire market that he or she cannot affect the product's price.");
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 252 ("Because each individual firm sells
a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, its decisions have no impact
on market price.... The assumption of price taking applies to consumers as well
as firms.").
74. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 290 ("Perfect competition also requires
that all resources be completely mobile. Each resource must, in other words, be
able to enter or leave the market with ease and to switch from one use to another
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4. All market participants (i.e., all buyers and sellers) are fully in-
formed of all relevant economic and technological data;75
5. All products are homogeneous, or rather, constitute inter-
changeable substitutes for each other;76 and
6. The forces of supply and demand are free to determine the
quantity of output in a relevant market, as well as to determine
a market-clearing, competitive price with respect to the same. 77
Microeconomic theory teaches that if these conditions are met, the
perfectly competitive model will create efficiencies in consumption,
production, and allocation.78 Further, it is through the creation of
such efficiencies that a perfectly competitive market promises the
greatest social opportunity for wealth creation 79 in that it promises
greater output at lower prices.8 0 It is within this social context that
value-enhancing exchange transactions take place, thereby minimiz-
ing economic waste. In pure economic parlance, pareto efficiencies are
without fuss or bother."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 253 ("[Flree
entry (exit), means that there are no special costs that make it difficult for a new
firm either to enter an industry and produce or to exit if it cannot make a profit.
As a result, buyers can easily switch from one supplier to another, and suppliers
can easily enter or exit a market.").
75. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 290-91 ("[Plerfect competition requires
that consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the rele-
vant economic and technological data. Consumers must be aware of all prices.
Laborers and owners of capital must be aware of how much their resources will
bring in all possible uses. Firms must know the prices of all inputs and the char-
acteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest sense, perfect competi-
tion requires that all of these economic decision-making units have an accurate
knowledge of the past, the present, and the future."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 67, at 595 ("[W]e have assumed that consumers and producers have
complete information about the economic variables that are relevant for the
choices they face.").
76. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 405 (noting that in perfectly competi-
tive situations the goods sold are "completely homogeneous from one seller to
another"); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 252-53 ("Price-taking behav-
ior typically occurs in markets where firms produce identical, or nearly identical,
products. When the products of all of the firms in a market are perfectly substitut-
able with one another-that is, when they are homogeneous-no firm can raise
the price of its product above the price of other firms without losing most or all of
its business.").
77. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 347-48 ("We have seen that a perfectly
competitive economy maximizes the total net gain of consumers and producers.
We then showed .. how deadweight losses-reductions in economic efficiency-
result if the government [obstructs the forces of supply and demand by imposing]
a price ceiling[,] . . . a price floor[,] . . . a tariff, a quota, or an excise tax.");
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 55 n.2 ("The market mechanism is the
tendency for supply and demand to equilibrate (i.e., for price to move to the mar-
ket-clearing level), so that there is neither excess demand nor excess supply.").
78. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 575-85, 590-91.
79. See id.
80. COLANDER, supra note 64, at 221.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
achieved; that is, goods are efficiently allocated through exchange
transactions such that "no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off."81
If the above operational conditions must be met in order for the
perfectly competitive market to achieve the efficiencies for which it is
so highly touted, then, from a purely economic perspective, the ob-
struction of one or more such conditions threatens the value-enhanc-
ing, wealth-producing attributes of a laissez faire market.
Accordingly, the underlying conditions of the perfectly competitive ec-
onomic model provide a powerful analytical paradigm for assessing
the presence of economic waste in the contractual setting. If the con-
ditions are met, economic theory indicates that there will be no waste.
Through the interaction of buyers and sellers, the market forces of
supply and demand will determine efficient output levels and prices
such that resources will be directed to their highest valued uses.8 2
B. Economics of Rationality and Utility Maximization
Central to the perfectly competitive model is the assumption that
all market participants are rational, with rational action being de-
fined by the principle of utility/profit maximization.8 3 Any act of con-
81. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 567.
82. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 741, 746 (1982) ("The contract price is normally the most efficient price, in
the economist's sense of that term, because permitting the price of a commodity
to be determined by the interaction of buyers and sellers will normally move the
commodity to its highest-valued uses, as expressed by the amounts competing
buyers are willing to pay, and will best allocate the factors necessary for the com-
modity's production."); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 735-36
("The basic notion is that an economy will operate 'efficiently' only to the extent
that available goods and resources are utilized in their most productive manner.
Ideally, each good must be consumed by the person who values it most highly,
and each factor of production must be employed in the way that produces the
most valued output.... A bargained-for exchange from which both parties benefit
is socially desirable in the sense that it results in a gain in efficiency by moving
the assets that are exchanged to higher valued uses.").
83. See COLANDER, supra note 64, at 242 (noting that "firms are profit-maximizing
entrepreneurial firms"); id. at 181 ("The analysis of rational choice is the analysis
of how individuals choose goods within their budget in order to maximize total
utility, and how maximizing total utility can be accomplished by considering mar-
ginal utility. That analysis begins with the premise that rational individuals
want as much satisfaction as they can get from their available resources. The
term rational in economics means, specifically, that people prefer more to less
and will make choices that give them as much satisfaction as possible."); LAND-
SBURG, supra note 72, at 634 ("The economist assumes that people act according
to the principle of equimarginality. This is often expressed by saying that the
economist assumes that people are rational. Indeed, it has been said that a stu-
dent becomes a true economist on the day when he fully understands and accepts
the principle that people equate costs and benefits at the margin."); EDWIN MANS-
FIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 55 (6th ed. 1988) ("Given the
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sumption or production that fails to maximize the utility8 4 or profit of
an individual or firm is considered irrational economic behavior.8 5 Ec-
onomic rationality necessarily requires that all costs and benefits be
considered when exercising economic choices. Consequently, in order
to act rationally, all market participants must be fully informed of all
costs and benefits associated with their respective economic activi-
ties.8 6 Once informed of all activity costs and benefits, an economi-
cally rational actor will weigh his or her costs and benefits, and if the
benefits exceed or equal the costs, he or she will engage in such activ-
ity.87 To the extent that all such costs and benefits are not consid-
ered-that is, they are external to the rational decisionmaking
consumer's tastes, we assume that he or she is rational, in the sense that he or
she tries to maximize utility."); STEPHEN A. MATHIS & JANET KoscANsKi,
MICROECONOMIc THEORY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (2002) ("[M]aking rational
choices is a matter of choosing the amount(s) of some decision, or independent,
variable(s) such that the extra benefit received from the last unit chosen is just
equal to its extra cost. In economics, the process of measuring and comparing the
extra benefits and extra costs associated with a rational decision is known as
marginal analysis."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 254 ("The assump-
tion of profit maximization is frequently used in microeconomics because it
predicts business behavior reasonably accurately and avoids unnecessary analyt-
ical complications.").
84. See COLANDER, supra, note 64, at 179 ("Utility refers to the satisfaction one gets
from consuming a good or service."); see also PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note
67, at 73 ("In the language of economics, the concept of utility refers to the numer-
ical score representing the satisfaction that a consumer gets from a market basket.
In other words, utility is a device used to simplify the ranking of market baskets.
If buying three copies of this textbook makes you happier than buying one shirt,
then we say that the books give you more utility than the shirt."); MATHIS & Kos-
cIANsID, supra note 83, at 45-46 ("Economists use the term utility to refer to the
satisfaction an individual receives from consuming goods and services. Thus, we
can express the level of utility that an individual derives from consuming various
combinations of goods and services in terms of a relationship known as a utility
function, defined as a function that expresses a consumer's level of utility in terms
of the amounts of goods and services she consumes. Mathematically, we can ex-
press a utility function as U = U(X, Y, W, . . . Z), where U represents some mea-
sure of a consumer's utility and X, Y, W, . . . Z, represent her consumption levels
of various goods and services.").
85. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
86. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 290-91 ("[Plerfect competition requires
that consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the rele-
vant economic and technological data.... Firms must know the prices of all in-
puts and the characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest sense,
perfect competition requires that all of these economic decision-making units
have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present, and the future.").
87. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 31 (3d ed. 2006)
("Choose the combination of [goods and/or inputs] that maximizes net benefits."
(emphasis omitted)).
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process-non-utility/profit-maximizing choices will be made, resulting
in unacceptable market inefficiencies.8 8
The premise that market transactions are fueled and driven by the
exercise of rational choice on behalf of market participants (i.e.,
"[mluch of what people do reflects their rational self-interest")8 9 is not
new or novel in the field of economics. Rather, rational choice has long
been acknowledged as the driving force of commercial and contractual
activity. For example, Adam Smith observed, "[T]he propensity to
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another... is common to all
men, and to be found in no other race of animals ... ."90 And as Smith
eloquently illustrates, this propensity to engage in contracts of ex-
change is driven principally by the human faculties of reason and
speech: 91
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in
vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is
for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever
offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that
which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every
such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far
greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our din-
ner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to
our humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessi-
ties but of their advantages. 9 2
The innate propensity to truck, barter, and exchange is ultimately
facilitated by contractual instruments reflecting the rational choice of
contracting parties. Assuming each party is rational at the time of
contracting, seeking to maximize his or her utility by entering into an
exchange transaction, their conduct will result in a value-enhancing,
bargained-for exchange.9 3 Through the exchange process, each party
seeks to gain value by offering value to the other. As conventional
economic theory explains, each rational contracting participant "uses
all prevailing information available to choose among various goods
and services with the explicit goal of maximizing her utility."9 4 It
88. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 67, at 675 ("[P]roducers act in ways that cause
harm to others without paying the full cost of the damage. In these and other,
similar cases, the pursuit of private gain will not necessarily promote the social
welfare.").
89. COLANDER, supra note 64, at 178.
90. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 15.
93. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 736 ("A bargained-for exchange from
which both parties benefit is socially desirable in the sense that it results in a
gain in efficiency by moving the assets that are exchanged to higher valued
uses.").
94. MATHIS & KosciAsgi, supra note 83, at 47.
[Vol. 85:875
2007] ECONOMIC WASTE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES
then can be said that the two fundamental explanatory variables driv-
ing all contractual relationships are (1) each party's perceived gain in
utility effectuated by their contract, and (2) the price to be paid for
same.95
The principle of rational choice, as illustrated in Figure 2, posits
that a market participant will choose to engage in a contract of ex-
change if his or her marginal utility of doing so exceeds his or her
choice to the contrary. Rational economic action is thus defined as
action taken for the purpose of maximizing the actor's marginal util-
ity. Contracts effectuated by rational choice are encouraged and en-
forced as a matter of public policy because of their wealth-creating
nature. 96 Scarce resources are ultimately allocated to those who value
them most through the process of voluntary, value-enhancing
exchanges. 97
The law of contracts, therefore, must not only honor the economic
principles of rationality, but implement such principles in the forma-
tion of its remedies. The bargained-for exchange of interpersonal util-
ity is the foundation of all rational exchange transactions, and this
exchange of interpersonal utility must not be arbitrarily ignored when
crafting a remedy for breach. This premise is particularly important
with respect to whether the law of contracts should implement a rem-
edy grounded on the cost of completing one's performance or the dimi-
nution in value resulting from one's failure to perform in accordance
with contract terms. When the law of contracts mandates for the for-
95. COLANDER, supra note 64, at 179.
96. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.3, at 736 ("Through voluntary agreements, in
which individuals exchange assets that they own for others that they value more,
society progresses toward the goal of economic efficiency.").
97. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 9-10 (5th ed. 2003)
("Neoclassical legal economists observe that people allocate society's scarce re-
sources through the exchange process. Voluntary exchange occurs in a free-mar-
ket setting because the parties, seeking to maximize their economic welfare, give
up resources in return for more valuable resources. Such exchange is socially
desirable because it moves resources to 'higher valued uses,' thereby increasing
'allocative efficiency.' By pursuing self-interest, then, people promote the inter-
ests of society. Skeptical of the capacity of lawmakers to improve on this 'private'
method of economic organization, neoclassical legal economists believe that con-
tract law appropriately enforces voluntary exchange." (quoting ROBERT A. HILL-
MAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 214 (1997))); see also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. b (1981) ("Bargains are widely believed to be
beneficial to the community in the provision of opportunities for freedom of indi-
vidual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which productive en-
ergy and product are apportioned in the economy. The enforcement of bargains
rests in part on the common belief that enforcement enhances that utility. Where
one party has performed, there are additional grounds for enforcement. Where,
for example, one party has received goods from the other and has broken his
promise to pay for them, enforcement of the promise ... encourages the making
of socially useful bargains . . ").
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FIGURE 2
The Principle of Rational Choice
If MUK/PK > MU.. K/P.. x, rational market participant chooses to contract.
If MUK/PK < MU.. K/Pno K, rational market participant chooses not to contract.
MU = Marginal Utility
P = Price
K = Contract
* Rational market participants engage in contract in which the incremental utility
of doing so exceeds the incremental utility of refraining to contract.
mation of a remedy grounded on diminution in value rather than cost
of completing performance, such a remedy may ultimately nurture an
inefficient outcome to the extent it ignores the aggrieved party's util-
ity revealed at the time of contracting. Contract law's disproportional-
ity test,9 8 if not understood within this context, will result in the
imposition of an economically inefficient remedy generating the very
economic waste the test was intended to discourage. 99
C. Fully Informed Market Participants
Rationality requires that market participants be fully informed of
all relevant economic and technological data.100 In fact, as noted
above, having fully informed market participants is an essential oper-
ational condition of the perfectly competitive model. Without full in-
formation, distortions in output and price result. If at the time of
contracting a party is ignorant of information relevant to the interper-
sonal utility he or she attaches to the other party's expected perform-
ance, such ignorance distorts the true value of the contract. To the
extent such ignorance is relevant to the party's core expectations with
respect to the transaction in question, the consummation and execu-
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) (1981).
99. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.13, at 790 ("The less generous measure of
damages for partial breach, based on the diminution in market price, is some-
times defended on the ground that allowing the more generous measure, based on
cost to remedy the defect, would result in 'economic waste.'"); see also County of
Maricopa v. Walsh & Oberg Architects, Inc., 494 P.2d 44, 46-47 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972) ("If economic waste is present, the effect is to award damages on the basis
of the difference in value of the building had it been completed in accordance with
the contract and the value of the building as erected, rather than on the basis of
reasonable cost of completion to conform to the contract." (emphasis added)); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 346(1) cmt. b (1932) ("There are numerous cases...
in which the value of the finished product is much less than the cost of producing
it after the breach has occurred. Sometimes defects in a completed structure can-
not be physically remedied without tearing down and rebuilding, at a cost that
would be imprudent and unreasonable. The law does not require damages to be
measured by a method requiring such economic waste." (emphasis added)).
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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tion of the transaction results in an inefficient allocation of resources,
i.e., scarce resources will not be directed to those who value them
most. The lack or inaccuracy of the available information relevant to
the transaction at the time of contracting may likely cause a party to
engage in an exchange transaction that he or she otherwise would
choose to avoid. Such an exchange transaction is pareto inefficient;1o1
the party disadvantaged by incomplete or inaccurate information at
the time of contracting may indeed be made worse off by engaging in
the proposed exchange transaction.
If at the time of contracting a party reveals the interpersonal util-
ity he or she attaches to a specific term relating to the other party's
performance, the failure of that term will likewise result in an ineffi-
cient exchange transaction. But for the expected performance of the
referenced term and utility attached thereto, the party would not en-
gage in the transaction. Accordingly, knowledge regarding true value
of the other party's performance is critical for a party to exercise ra-
tional choice with respect to an exchange transaction. For example, in
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,102 had the nonbreaching
parties known at the time of contracting that there was going to be a
failure in performance of the restoration terms of the transaction by
the coal and mining company, it is likely that the aggrieved party
would have rejected the proposed exchange transaction. Similarly, a
party's knowledge that upon breach of such performance the law of
contracts might deny the recovery of a party's lost expected utility at-
tached to the other party's performance, the aggrieved parties may
likely choose to avoid the proposed exchange transaction.
The aggrieved parties in Peevyhouse placed significant interper-
sonal utility on having their farm restored to its pre-contract condi-
tion. 1 0 3 Such value directly influenced their negotiations with respect
to the price terms of the leasehold, and therefore was a critical compo-
nent of the proposed transaction.104 At the time of consummation, the
agreed exchange transaction was seemingly pareto efficient, provided
the restoration terms were performed. However, Garland Coal's stra-
tegic decision not to perform ultimately rendered the exchange trans-
action to be pareto inefficient, especially in light of the court's decision
denying the Peevyhouses' recovery of their lost expected utility mea-
sured in terms of cost-of-performance damages.
Remarkably and ironically, the consummated pareto efficient ex-
change transaction was subsequently rendered pareto inefficient by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court on the grounds of economic effi-
101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
102. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
103. Id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ciency.l 0 5 Peevyhouse illustrates the illogical circularity inherent in
the jurisprudential approach to such exchange transactions. The in-
terpersonal utility attached by the Peevyhouses and acknowledged by
Garland Coal with respect to the restoration performance term at the
time of contracting created an efficient exchange transaction.1o6 And
yet, the court refused to award cost-of-performance damages because
it viewed such an award as economically inefficient.1 07 On the con-
trary, a pareto efficient outcome could have nonetheless been attained
by awarding the aggrieved parties the cost-of-performance damages.
Such an award, and only such an award, places the nonbreaching par-
ties in the position in which they would have been had their farmland
been restored by the coal mining company.OS
D. The Unfettered Forces of Supply and Demand Must Be
Free to Determine Price and Output Levels
It has long been accepted in the field of microeconomics that the
efficiency of the market mechanism necessarily depends on the ten-
dency of supply and demand to equilibrate' 0 9 and determine an equi-
librium market price and output level.ll0
As Professor Samuelson instructs, "By determining the equilib-
rium prices and quantities, the market allocates or rations . . .the
scarce goods of... society among ... possible uses."1' The unfettered
forces of supply and demand efficiently determine the desired level or
output, as well as a market-clearing competitive price with respect to
same. Such equilibrating forces ultimately minimize, if not eliminate,
any economic waste characterized by shortages and surpluses. Such
105. See id. at 113 ("In view of the unrealistic fact situation in the instant case, and
certain Oklahoma statutes to be hereinafter noted, we are of the opinion that the
'relative economic benefit' is a proper consideration here. This in accord with the
recent case of Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78, where in applying the
cost rule, the Virginia court specifically noted that 'the defects are remediable
from a practical standpoint and the costs are not grossly disproportionate to the
results to be obtained.'").
106. As the dissenting opinion to the case notes,
Defendant had knowledge of the benefits that it would receive under the
contract and the approximate cost of performing the contract. With this
knowledge, it must be presumed that defendant thought that it would be
to its economic advantage to enter into the contract with plaintiffs and
that it would reap benefits from the contract, or it would have not en-
tered into the contract.
Id. at 115 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 113-14 (majority opinion).
108. See id. at 114-16 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
110. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 56 (17th ed. 2001)
("We find the market equilibrium by looking for the price at which quantity de-
manded equals quantity supplied.").
111. Id. at 60; see also COLANDER, supra note 64, at 96-98.
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FIGURE 3
The market equilibrium
price (P) and quantity (Q,) is
determined at point E, the
intersection of supply and
demand. At price P, market
participants willingly supply
what other market participants
willingly demand. When the
price is too low (e.g., PL),
quantity demanded exceeds
quantity supplied, shortages
result, and the price is driven
up to equilibrium. When price
is too high (e.g., PH), quantity
supplied exceeds quantity
demanded, surpluses result, and
the price is driven down to
equilibrium.
k D Surplus
S
...... "E-Equilibrium Point
Shortage
an efficient outcome, however, is premised on supply-and-demand
forces being free to equilibrate. To the extent these market forces are
obstructed and therefore are not free to determine efficient output
levels and prices, economic waste should reasonably be expected. For
example, a legally imposed price control that either arbitrarily man-
dates a price below or above the equilibrium price (Pe) results in either
inefficient surpluses or shortages as depicted in Figure 3.112
An inefficient default rule regarding the measure of damages can
operate as a de facto price control; it can arbitrarily obstruct the equi-
librating forces of supply and demand. By ignoring a contract price
set by the supply-and-demand forces driving the consummation of an
exchange transaction, an inefficient default rule will effectuate an
inefficient surplus or shortage, depending on whether its implementa-
tion results in an actual price above or below the otherwise market
price stated in the contract.
Figure 4 depicts the effect of inefficient default rules that ulti-
mately work to obstruct the otherwise autonomous forces of supply
and demand. If we assume that the contract price in Peevyhouse re-
flects the value attached by the Peevyhouses for agreeing to lease
their land for strip mining purposes (i.e., rent, royalties, and restora-
tion) as well as what Garland Coal is willing pay to lease such land
112. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 110, at 79-82; see also COLANDER, supra
note 64, at 113-16; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 67, at 288-93; MATHIS &
KoscIANSKI, supra note 83, at 326-31.
899
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:875
FIGURE 4
Default Rule:
Penalty for
purchaser's non-
D performance
SAt price P, market PH ------------------....
participants willingly supply what
other market participants willingly
demand. When the default rule
prohibits the recover of cost of Pe - ----------------- E-Equilibrium Point
completion damages in a contract
in which completion of
performance is an integral part of
the supplier's contract price, such
a rule effectively places a ceiling PL ---------- -4-------
on the contract price of PL
resulting in a shortage of supply. cost mletio
Similarly, a default rule that
provides a supplier recovery in damages
excess of the negotiated price PH I
(for a purchaser's breach) results
in a surplus. __
Qe
(i.e., rent, royalties, and restoration), then a default rule that prohibits
the Peevyhouses from recovering restoration costs upon Garland
Coal's nonperformance results in an effective price below that which
would otherwise be determined by their individual supply and de-
mand functions. Such a default rule operates to impose a price control
with respect to the leasing of farmland for strip mining purposes.
E. An Incoherent Application of an Ambiguous Default Rule
Regarding Cost of Completion Damages Threatens
Several Operational Conditions Necessary for
the Perfectly Competitive Model to Thrive
As discussed above, an incoherent application of an ambiguous de-
fault rule regarding the cost of completion damages threatens several
of the operational conditions of the perfectly competitive model, i.e.,
rationality, fully informed market participants, and unimpeded sup-
ply-and-demand forces. The extent to which an incoherent application
of the default rule arbitrarily results in the denial of cost-of-perform-
ance damages raises grave concerns regarding the efficiency in the
marketplace. It ignores the aggrieved party's utility attached to the
breaching party's performance that is likely to influence a rational de-
cision with respect to whether the nonbreaching party should engage
in an exchange transaction; it creates an environment of asymmetrical
information regarding enhancement of the contracting parties' utility
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attached to the perceived (un)certainty of performance at the time of
contract formation; and finally, an incoherent application of an ambig-
uous default rule may ultimately impede the capacity of supply and
demand to determine an efficient, market-clearing price.
IV. GAME THEORY-AN ANALYSIS OF
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR113
A. Extensive Form Games and the Need for Unambiguous
and Certain Default Rule
Using a traditional game theory model (specifically, the "extensive
form game"),l14 the following analysis further demonstrates the ineffi-
ciencies resulting from a contract regime in which the recovery of cost-
of-performance damages is influenced by an ambiguous doctrine of ec-
onomic waste or its related disproportionality test. The following ex-
ample i i 5 incorporates the basic facts and circumstances addressed in
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co. 116
Figure 5 summarizes a normal form game in which it is assumed
the law of contracts will not hold a breaching party liable for cost-of-
performance damages. As the first players in the game, the
Peevyhouses must decide whether to engage in an exchange transac-
tion and place their farm under the control of the Garland Coal Min-
ing Co. If they decide to engage in a leasehold transaction with
Garland Coal, as the second player in the game, Garland Coal must
decide whether to cooperate in accordance with the terms of the par-
ties' transaction or to appropriate (i.e., breach) by failing to restore the
Peevyhouses' farmland. Cooperation is pareto efficient because both
parties are made better off by an exchange transaction. At the time of
contracting, the expected payoff of the transaction is allocated be-
tween the parties in the form of rent, royalties and profits (denoted
above as (TO). The transaction is value-enhancing as evidenced by a
113. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 7 (1994) ("Game theory, like all economic modeling, works by
simplifying a given social situation and stepping back from the many details that
are irrelevant to the problem at hand. The test of the model is whether it can
hone our intuition by illuminating the basic forces that are at work but not
plainly visible when we look at an actual case in all its detail.").
114. Id. at 50 ("[T]he extensive form game, which models explicitly the actions that the
players take, the sequence in which they take them, and the information they
have when they take these actions. Because of its emphasis on actions, the se-
quence in which those actions are taken, and the information available to the
players at each move, the extensive form game is often the appropriate way to
model interactions between parties that take place over time.").
115. For a discussion and application of an agency game with and without contract
enforcement from which the example in the above text was drawn, see ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & ECONOMICS 196-201 (4th ed. 2004).
116. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d. 109 (Okla. 1962).
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FIGURE 5
Normal Form Game-Ambiguous or Absence of Default Rule
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co.
Garland Coal Mining Co. (Second Player)
Cooperate by Performing Appropriate by Non-
Promise to Restore Farmland Performance of Promise
to Restore Farmland
(TO - W) > 0 (TO + (4 > 0
(shared payoff)
Willie & Lucille Engage in Exchange
Peevyhouse Transaction
(First Players)
() + (u > 0 () - (u') < 0
(shared payoff)
0 0
Reject Exchange
Transaction
0 0
shared payoff; both parties benefit from the exchange transaction.
The decision to appropriate is pareto inefficient because one party
(Garland Coal) is made better off at the expense of the other party
(Peevyhouse). The decision to appropriate redistributes all the bene-
fits to Garland Coal, the second player.
If the Peevyhouses decide to engage in an exchange transaction,
then Garland Coal receives more by appropriating than cooperating,
e.g., (TT) + (x'), where (x') equals the cost of restoration, (u') equals the
Peevyhouses' interpersonal utility attached to the restoration of their
farmland, and (x') approximates (u'). Thus, Garland Coal's best move
in the above game is to appropriate; appropriation is its dominant
strategy. 1 17 In anticipation of Garland Coal's dominant strategy, the
Peevyhouses best move is to reject an exchange transaction with Gar-
land Coal. Consequently, in circumstances in which the law of con-
tracts fails to enforce performance through the award of cost-of-
performance damages, value-enhancing transactions are discouraged.
The above payoff matrix changes dramatically if a responsive law
is assumed, a law that recognizes the availability of cost-of-perform-
ance damages in cases in which such performance is a material term
of the exchange transaction. Figure 6 depicts a revised payoff of the
normal form game involving the Peevyhouses (the first players) and
Garland Coal (the second player). In this game, it is assumed that the
law of contracts will hold the second player liable for cost-of-perform-
ance damages, regardless of the application of an economic waste doc-
117. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 115, at 197 n.4 ("Game theorists describe a move
that is best against any possible move by the other side as a 'dominant strat-
egy.'.. . The first player does not have dominant strategy, but the first player has
a best reply to the second player's dominant strategy.").
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trine. If the Peevyhouses engage in an exchange transaction with
Garland Coal, and Garland Coal performs, the parties experience a
pareto efficient transaction with both parties sharing the surplus (Tr)
created by their exchange. Similarly, a pareto efficient outcome is de-
rived even in the event of Garland Coal's breach. The game assumes
that an award of cost-of-performance damages places the Peevyhouses
in the position they would have been in had Garland performed its
obligation to restore the property to its pre-transaction condition.
FIGURE 6
Normal Form Game-Default Rule Compensates Cost of Performance = (x')
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Minining
Garland Coal Mining Co. (Second Player)
Cooperate by Performing Breach Award of Cost of
Promise to Restore Farmland Performance Damages
(TT) - (x') > 0 (On)-(x') > 0
(shared payoff)
Willie & Lucille Engage in Exchange
Peevyhouse Transaction
(First Players)
( + u) > 0 (+) + W) > 0
(shared payoff)
0 0
Reject Exchange
Transaction
0 0
If Garland Coal performs its obligation to restore the Peevyhouse
farmland to its pre-transaction condition, the anticipated surplus (Tr)
is shared by the parties in accordance with the terms of the transac-
tion. Alternatively, the Peevyhouses can receive a payoff of zero by
rejecting the proposed exchange transaction at inception. Faced with
these two alternatives, engaging in an exchange transaction with Gar-
land Coal is the Peevyhouses' best move.
In contrast, Garland Coal Mining Company's breach (appropria-
tion) yields a payoff to Garland Coal of (11 ), from which Garland Coal
must pay compensation of (x') to the Peevyhouses equal to (u'), the
utility the Peevyhouses expected from the restoration of their farm-
land. In this game, Garland Coal cannot be made better off by failing
to perform, and may even find itself worse off to the extent that the
value (x') derived within the adversarial process, given the potential
for measurement error, is greater than its expected payoff (Tr). Conse-
quently, the best move for Garland Coal is to cooperate and perform
its promise to restore the farmland. Because Garland Coal's best
move is to cooperate by performance, the best move for the
Peevyhouses is to engage in an exchange transaction which is ulti-
mately value enhancing.
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B. Asymmetrical Information and the Advantages of Repeat
Players
Although game theory postulates that a repeatedly played game
fosters ultimate cooperation,11s this only holds to the extent the re-
peated game includes the same players. Should the Peevyhouses and
Garland Coal ever have the opportunity to engage in another ex-
change transaction, both parties will possess knowledge of each
player's previous play; a subsequent transaction will be possible only
if the parties indeed cooperate, especially given Garland Coal's previ-
ous breach. Such cooperation might be effectuated by the
Peevyhouses insisting that their payoff include their anticipated cost
restoration, or by securing Garland Coal's performance with a bond.
Repeated play, however, is highly improbable with respect to the
parties in Peevyhouse, especially given the nature of the transaction.
First, the subject matter of the transaction is not susceptible to re-
peated play. Once the farmland is mined and its resources depleted, it
is unlikely that it will be mined again. While Garland Coal more than
likely will play in other games with other parties by leasing land for
strip mining purposes, it is less likely that the Peevyhouses will have
similar opportunities. Thus, while the Peevyhouses are likely to be
one-time players, Garland Coal is a repeat player to the extent that it
repeatedly engages in similar exchange transactions. This difference
is significant because it results in information asymmetries that fur-
ther the potential of economic waste at the time of contract formation.
Given that Garland Coal is likely a repeat player, it may amortize
the cost of obtaining knowledge of the existing legal rule over several,
even hundreds of transactions. On the other hand, the Peevyhouses
are likely to be one-time players, and as such they do not have the
capability to amortize these costs over several transactions. The
118. Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417, 422 (1993) (re-
viewing ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991)) ("When people are tied to each other in an enduring relation-
ship, the game of cooperation is played over and over again. If a person 'cheats' in
one round of the game, the victim will have the opportunity to retaliate in subse-
quent rounds. The future interest of the parties in the relationship may cause
them to cooperate in each play of the game. In general, one-shot games with
noncooperative solutions often have cooperative solutions when they are re-
peated."); see also Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L.
L.J. 301, 307 (1990) ("The opportunity for players to punish one another in future
periods for cheating, coupled with the fact that mutual compliance is better for
everyone than mutual cheating, offers some hope that compliance can be sus-
tained over time. But sustained compliance is by no means assured."); ERIC RAS-
MUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY, chs. 4-5
(1989); DAVID M. KREps, A COURSE IN MICROECONoMIc THEORY 505-15 (1990);
Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Dis-
counting or with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533 (1986).
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Peevyhouses and others similarly situated are likely to rely on their
common sense (i.e., uninformed legal advice) at the time of con-
tracting. Accordingly, when repeat players contract with one-time
players, "there is likely to be asymmetric information about the con-
tent of the contract law."119 In such situations, repeat players are in a
position to leverage the asymmetrical information to their advantage,
and one-time players are disadvantaged with respect to making a ra-
tionale choice at the time of contracting.
C. Determining an Appropriate Default Rule12O
The anticipated strategic behavior of the parties discussed above
demonstrates the need for a more appropriate default rule regarding
the award of damages in construction cases. As it stands today, the
generally accepted default rule regarding the award of damages in
construction cases appears to be grounded on the court's assessment
of what constitutes economic waste at the time of breach. Such an
approach is erroneous from both an economic and a jurisprudential
perspective. From an economic perspective, it is clear that the courts
misunderstand the concept of economic waste. More importantly,
from a jurisprudential perspective, it has long been acknowledged that
the determination of an appropriate default rule should be grounded
upon the expectations of the contracting parties at the time of forma-
tion and not at the time of breach. 1 21 It should be derived by discern-
119. RANDY E. BARNETT, TEACHER'S MANUAL, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE 66 (3d
ed. 2003). See also id. at 66-67 (wherein Professor Barnett formalizes the analy-
sis with respect to jurisprudential determination of default rules); Timothy J.
Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Sub-
jective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 390 (1983) ("If the law awards diminution,
individuals likely to have subjective value might systematically underprotect
themselves because they did not understand the law enough ....").
120. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) ("Default rules fill the gaps in
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them."). In
the case of construction contracts in which the parties failed to expressly
stipulate the nature of damages recoverable for breach, a nonbreaching party's
right to recovery is governed by the common law default rule allowing cost-of-
completion damages unless the award of such damages will result in economic
waste (as judicially understood) as evidenced by the disproportionality of such
damages to the otherwise resulting diminution in value. For other notable works
on default terms, see Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to
Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 639 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089 (1981); Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent
Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV. 169 (1993).
121. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 120, at 89 & n.18.
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ing "how the parties would have provided for it had they sought to do
S0."122
V. THE CASE FOR A NEW DEFAULT RULE
A. Fallacies Under the Current Default Rule
In order to summarize the prior discussions, it is helpful to identify
and dispel the fallacies of the justifications asserted by the courts for
refusing to award an aggrieved party his cost of performance for
breach of a construction contract.
First, the current approach to the award of contract damages in
construction cases does not prevent economic waste. Despite the justi-
fication used by the courts for not awarding an aggrieved party his
cost of performance, there is no economic waste created by simply ful-
filling the intent of the parties. On the contrary, courts resorting to
this alternative measure of damages under the current approach are,
in fact, creating economic waste by not fulfilling the intent of the par-
ties. Under the perfectly competitive model, the aggrieved party prob-
ably would not have entered into the transaction had he known
beforehand that his expectation interests would not be satisfied by full
performance or damages sufficient to substitute for full performance.
Moreover, awarding an aggrieved party his cost of performance
does not create a windfall for such party. The fact that the aggrieved
party may choose to spend his damages on something other than rem-
edying the defect should be irrelevant to the determination of the
proper measure of damages. 123 This is routinely done in the context of
casualty insurance in that the insured is compensated for the cost of
repair or replacement of the property suffering the casualty. Gener-
ally, there is no requirement that the insured fix or replace the prop-
erty with the insurance proceeds. Moreover, the threat of this
happening is not factored into what the insurance company is re-
quired to pay. This is simply a reallocation of resources and cannot be
properly classified as economic waste. 124 If there is a windfall by an
award of damages in construction cases, it is created in favor of the
breaching party when the court allows him to keep the cost of per-
formance that he presumably factored into his transaction costs, ironi-
cally catapulting the breacher into a better position than he would
have had upon full performance.
122. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96 (6th ed. 2003).
123. See Emery v. Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co., 374 A.2d 929, 933 (N.H. 1977) ("If the
plaintiffs choose to 'pocket' their recovery, they will have foregone the restoration
of their land; they will not have been unjustly enriched."); see also Marschall,
supra note 14, at 746, 758.
124. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 1158 ("An award of damages, however, merely
redistributes wealth between the parties, and therefore cannot in itself involve
waste.").
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Lastly, the current approach does not account for the fact that the
avoidance doctrines are available to relieve one or both parties of du-
ties to perform under transactions in which perfect information is not
known to both parties or when the perfect information changes as a
result of unforeseeable and uncontrollable forces.125
B. An Efficient and More Appropriate Default Rule
The default rule regarding the proper measure of damages in
breach of a construction case should reflect certainty in that the con-
tracting parties should be able to rely on it at the time of contracting
as an essential part of their perfect information in weighing the costs
and benefits of entering into the transaction. In light of the need for
certainty, the default rule governing the proper determination of the
loss of value of performance upon breach of a construction contract
should be simply written as follows:
If the breach results in defective or unfinished construction and the loss in
value to the injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may re-
cover damages based on the diminution in the market price of the property
caused by the breach. 1 2 6
Under this simply stated rule, an aggrieved party would receive
his cost of performance where he can establish the same with the de-
gree of certainty required by contract law jurisprudence.12 7 Observe
that this new and improved default rule eliminates any reference to
economic waste or a disproportionality test. As demonstrated above,
such doctrines have no relevance in the analysis and therefore should
play no role in assessing and awarding expectation damages in con-
struction cases. As Figure 7 illustrates, if the aggrieved party cannot
prove his cost of performance with sufficient evidence, then, and only
then, his loss of value is measured by the diminution in value caused
by the deficient performance. This comports with the general goal of
compensating the aggrieved party for the loss he sustains due to less
than full performance by the breaching party. In any case, the initial
inquiry should be whether the aggrieved party can adduce sufficient
evidence of the cost of substitute performance.
Generally, a party is entitled to such damages as he can prove were
caused by the breach and in the amount established with sufficient
125. See, e.g., Chomsky, supra note 8, at 1500 (discussing the availability of the doc-
trine of impracticability to relieve a party from contractual obligations where a
change in circumstances renders performance severely more burdensome than
originally contemplated).
126. This statement is simply an abbreviated version of the provision in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, recognizing that provable loss of value should be the
main focus and eliminating consideration of the disproportionality of the loss to
the cost of performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)
(1981).
127. Id. § 352.
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FIGURE 7
Damages for Breach in Defective or Unfinished Construction Cases-
An Efficient and More Appropriate Default Rule
Breach = Unfinished or defective construction
Damages = Cost of completion or cost to remedy, unless nonbreaching party
attaches no values to completion or nondefective performance,
then only diminution in value.
certainty. 128 This limitation on the type and amount of damages re-
coverable by an aggrieved party ensures that the award is not based
on mere speculation or conjecture. 129 Thus, an aggrieved party would
still be required to adduce competent evidence of the cause and
amount of his actual loss as a condition of recovering his cost of
performance.
This rule also preserves the long-standing procedure of determin-
ing the loss of value in terms of the actual worth of full performance to
the aggrieved party, not to the "hypothetical reasonable person."130
In the same vein, whether courts view the value of full performance in
terms of what the parties agreed it would be worth is irrelevant for the
purpose of determining the loss of value to the aggrieved party. This
hands-off approach is consistent with the rationale for not inquiring
into the adequacy of consideration in that the court normally will not
substitute its judgment for that of the parties in determining the
worth of the exchange.1 3 1 At the damages stage of the analysis, courts
should not be engaged in a determination of whether the aggrieved
party truly wanted the performance for which he contracted. Rules of
construction and interpretation serve to establish the relevant terms
of the contract early in the litigation so that the court will know what
duties were relevant way before the matter reaches the damages
phase. Thus, if the unfulfilled duty was included as a term of the con-
tract, it is better to err on the side of regarding the duty as an essen-
tial term of the parties' bargain, lest we upset the bargaining process
by artificially assigning a pecking order of importance to terms that
the parties presumably considered at great length prior to engaging in
the transaction. On the other hand, if the breaching party has credi-
ble and competent evidence that the aggrieved party placed no value
on the unfulfilled duty at the time of contracting, let him navigate the
128. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 257 (4th ed. 2004).
129. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.15, at 799-800.
130. See id. § 12.8, at 758 ("Damages based on expectation should therefore take ac-
count of any circumstances peculiar to the situation of the injured party, includ-
ing that party's own needs and opportunities, personal values, and even
idiosyncrasies.").
131. See id. § 2.11, at 71.
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maze of parol evidence rules in an effort to rebut the presumption of
materiality.
Assuming the aggrieved party has no trouble establishing that he
attached some value or utility in having the contract completed, the
amount of money that would allow him to obtain substitute perform-
ance is the proper measure of damages. Generally, this will not be a
problem where there is a market for the type of performance lacking
under the contract. However, if there is no such market, the ag-
grieved party may not be able to establish with sufficient certainty his
cost of obtaining substitute performance. In such rare situations, it
would be proper to resort to the alternative measure of damages-
diminution in value.
C. An Application of the New and Improved Default Rule
Let us return to the hypothetical regarding the missing hand-
carved fireplace mantel discussed in Part II, analyzing it under the
proposed default rule. Under the new and improved default rule, the
inquiry starts with whether the owner is able to prove with sufficient
certainty his loss of value caused by the contractor's failure to fully
perform. Since there is a readily available market for substitute per-
formance, the magnitude of cost-of-performance damages can be mea-
sured with reasonable certainty. Moreover, we know that the breach
caused the owner to be deprived of the fireplace mantel. Thus, our
analysis begins and ends with the cost of performance, and owner
would be entitled to recover or recoup from the contract price $20,000
as his cost of performance.
It bears mentioning that the default rule is just that, a rule that
applies in the absence of the parties' express agreement to be gov-
erned by another remedy. Thus, it allows the parties to opt out of its
application should they have the foresight and need to do so. By the
same token, it nurtures transaction efficiencies by requiring the par-
ties to contract around the default rule to the extent they so desire.
Such a clear and concise default rule would be a component of the
information available to contracting parties when deciding whether to
engage in the transaction; and they will be equipped and prepared to
factor into their analysis any potential application of the default rule,
as well as any other substitute remedy upon which they may agree.
Thus, the underlying operational conditions of the perfectly competi-
tive model are preserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of economic waste operates to interfere with contrac-
tual relationships by allowing the courts to second-guess the value of
the exchange assigned and agreed to by the parties. This flies in the
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face of the basic tenet of contract law of fulfilling the parties' intent.
In order to preserve the autonomy of contracting parties to deal with
each other as they see fit, it is essential that default rules governing
damages for breach of contract reflect the goal of awarding an ag-
grieved party the benefit of his bargain. This generally requires an
award of damages that will allow the aggrieved party to obtain substi-
tute performance, lest the perfectly competitive model of economics be
displaced by an altruistic judicial system. Moreover, when the justifi-
cations for depriving an aggrieved party of the benefit of his bargain
are based on unfounded fears of encouraging the waste of valuable
resources or providing a windfall to the aggrieved party, the need for
judicial restraint in this area is magnified. In these cases, the role of
the court should be limited to ensuring that the aggrieved party is
compensated in such an amount as necessary to reflect the value he
placed on the performance of which he has been deprived by the other
party's breach, nothing more and nothing less. As observed in Profes-
sor Corbin's treatise on contracts:
We have a free market, under our common law, for the reason that the courts
have left it free. They do not require that one person shall pay as much as
others may be willing to pay, or that one person shall receive as little as others
may be willing to receive for a like article. The contracting parties make their
own contracts, agree upon their own exchanges, and fix their own values. 1 3 2
The remarkable efficiencies of the free market have long been rec-
ognized both in theory and in practice, and it is imperative that our
common law accommodate the continued existence of such a market
by nurturing, maintaining, and promoting an environment within
which it may thrive. While the current default rule regarding the
awarding of damages in construction cases jeopardizes several of the
operational conditions of the perfectly competitive model (as demon-
strated in Part III above), the new and improved default rule as herein
discussed accommodates the requisite operational conditions of laissez
faire economics. By eliminating the misunderstood economic waste
doctrine and the disproportionality test from the analysis of expec-
tancy damages, the new and improved default rule constrains the
court's authority to arbitrarily interfere with one of the essential com-
ponents of perfect competition-the freedom of contract. The new and
improved default rule proposed herein endows contracting parties
with the right to make their own contracts, to agree upon their own
exchanges, and to fix their own values such that scarce resources may
be directed to those who value them most, thereby ultimately (and
ironically) minimizing the social evil of economic waste.
Of course, the policy reflected in the above-cited passage is not lim-
ited to defining a new and workable default rule for determining dam-
132. 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 5.14, at 65-66 (1995).
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ages in the breach of a construction case; this policy transcends every
aspect of contract damages. To this end, the current climate of invali-
dating liquidated damages clauses when the court regards them as
penalties is yet another area that suffers from hasty disregard of the
parties' intent by courts with altruistic notions of saving the parties
from themselves.133 Perhaps, this issue deserves a closer look as well.
Judges are apt to be naef simple-minded men, and they need something of
Mephistopheles. We too need education in the obvious-to learn to transcend
our own convictions and to leave room for much that we hold dear to be done
away with short of revolution by the orderly change of the law. 1 3 4
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
133. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
134. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the
Harvard Law School Association of New York (February 15, 1913), in THE OCCA-
SIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 172 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed. 1962).
